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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Joshua Moses has raised several challenges on appeal to his judgment of 
conviction and sentence for grand theft by extortion, along with a persistent violator 
sentencing enhancement, following a jury trial. This Reply Brief is necessary to address 
the State's responses on appeal. 1 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated 
in Mr. Moses' Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are 
incorporated herein by reference thereto. 
1 For purposes of this Brief, Mr. Moses will not reiterate his arguments regarding 
prosecutorial misconduct in closing arguments regarding the prosecutor's attempt to 
shift the State's burden of proof as to intent or why the cumulative errors that occurred 
in this case require reversal, but will rely on the arguments contained within his 
Appellant's Brief. 
1 
ISSUES 
1. Did the district court err when it permitted Mr. Branam's statements to Mr. Ward 
to be introduced under I.R.E. 801 (d)(2)(B) as an adoptive admission by 
Mr. Moses despite a lack of foundation? 
2. Did the district court err when the court refused to permit Mr. Moses to inquire 
about a juror who expressed reservations about his ability to participate given the 
anxiety attacks the juror was experiencing? 
3. Did the district court err when it refused to permit Mr. Moses to call a witness to 
the stand to testify about Mr. Branam's prior consistent statements after the court 
had allowed the State to present Mr. Branam's prior inconsistent statements? 
4. Did the prosecutor commit misconduct, rising to the level of a fundamental error, 
by arguing facts not in evidence, misstating the evidence, and appealing to the 
passions and prejudices of the jurors? 
2 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
The District Court Erred When It Permitted Mr. Branam's Statements To Mr. Ward To 
Be Introduced Under I.R.E. 801 (d)(2)(B) As Adoptive Admissions By Mr. Moses Despite 
A Lack Of Foundation 
A. Introduction 
Mr. Moses has challenged the district court's admission of statements made by 
Joshua Branam during a conversation with his brother-in-law, Walter Ward, as adoptive 
admissions against him. In response, the State has asserted that Mr. Moses' 
foundation objection made at trial was insufficient to preserve the same foundation 
objection raised on appeal; that the State's argument to the district court should be 
deemed an offer of proof so that this argument can be considered evidence to support 
foundation; and that there was sufficient foundation to admit the disputed statements as 
an adoptive admission on the part of Mr. Moses. The State, however, has not made 
any argument that the error in admitting these statements was harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt. 
Regarding the State's contentions on appeal, a review of the pertinent legal 
standards governing these claims reveals them to be without merit. Additionally, 
because the State has made no claim at all that the error in admitting the statements 
was harmless, the State has failed to meet its burden of persuasion that this error can 
be said to be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 
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B. Mr. Moses' Assertion That There Was Insufficient Foundation To Admit 
Mr. Branam's Statements As Adoptive Admissions Against Mr. Moses Was 
Preserved For Appeal 
The State, in this appeal, has asserted to this Court that Mr. Moses' objections 
on appeal to the lack of sufficient foundation to admit Mr. Branam's statements to his 
brother-in-law as an adoptive admission on the part of Mr. Moses were not preserved at 
trial. (Respondent's Brief, pp.7-B.) Although the State does acknowledge the fact that 
Mr. Moses objected to the admission of these statements due to a lack of foundation, 
the State apparently argues that Mr. Moses' further articulation and development of trial 
counsel's foundational objection somehow renders these arguments unpreserved. A 
review of pertinent legal standards governing the proper preservation of legal issues 
reveals the State's contention to be without merit. 
The controlling case on this point is State v. Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267 (2003). In 
Sheahan, the State objected to the defendant's argument on appeal that certain 
evidence was improperly admitted because it was "inadmissible habit evidence." 
Sheahan, 139 Idaho at 276-277. However, the objection raised by counsel at trial was 
that there was insufficient foundation for the admission of the same piece of evidence. 
Id. Despite the apparent differences between the challenge advanced before the trial 
court and that raised on appeal, the Sheahan Court found that the foundation objection 
raised at trial was sufficient to preserve the challenge to the evidence that was raised on 
appeal due to the fact that there was "sufficient overlap" between the two claims. Id. at 
277. 
In this case, the objection raised at trial and that raised on appeal are one and 
the same: that the State did not establish sufficient foundation for the admission of 
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Mr. Branam's statements as adoptive admissions imputed to Mr. Moses. In fact, the 
claims are identical. Both at trial and on appeal, Mr. Moses has asserted that, in order 
to admit a statement as an adoptive admission, the State must prove that the person to 
whom the statement would be attributed, "heard, understood and acquiesced in the 
statement." (Tr., p.35, Ls.6-15; Appellant's Brief, pp.16-18.) Both attrial and on appeal, 
the requirement that the State tender such proof was raised as an issue of sufficient 
foundation. (Tr., p.36, Ls.1-10; Appellant's Brief, pp.16-18.) 
To the extent that the State attempts to argue that this issue was not preserved 
because it was further elaborated upon on appeal, this contention is also unsupported in 
the law. Where the issue raised on appeal expands upon substantially the same 
argument that was raised at trial, the issue is properly preserved. See State v. Voss, 
152 Idaho 148,150 (Ct. App. 2011). Accordingly, the question of whether the State 
presented sufficient foundation for the admissibility of Mr. Branam's statements as an 
adoptive admission against Mr. Moses is properly before this Court. 
C. There Was Insufficient Foundation To Admit Mr. Branam's Statements As An 
Adoptive Admission Against Mr. Moses Under I.R.E. 801 (d)(2)(B) 
As an initial matter, the State appears to misapprehend Mr. Moses' core claim 
with regard to the lack of foundation for the admission of Mr. Branam's statements as an 
adoptive admission. The State characterizes Mr. Moses' challenge as follows, "Moses' 
only claim is that the court abused its discretion by making a ruling based solely on the 
state's offer of proof." (Respondent's Brief, p.9.) This, however, is not Mr. Moses' 
claim. 
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Mr. Moses' claim on appeal is that the State failed to present evidence that would 
establish the specific foundation required to admit a statement as an adoptive 
admission against a defendant. (Appellant's Brief, pp.16-18.) This required proof, at a 
minimum, that Mr. Moses heard the statements made by Mr. Branam, understood what 
was being said, that the circumstances were such that a reasonable person would be 
expected to respond, and that adoption of the statement was intended. See State v. 
Nguyen, 122 Idaho 151,155-156 (Ct. App. 1992); U.S. v. McKinney, 707 F.2d 381, 384 
(9th Cir. 1983); State v. Cookson, 657 A.2d 1154, 1157 (Me. 1995). And a defendant's 
mere presence when the statement is made is insufficient. Cookson, 657 A.2d at 1157. 
Even assuming that this Court characterizes the prosecutor's representations in 
its Brief in Support of the Motion in Limine as an offer of proof, the fact that Mr. Ward 
claimed to hear Mr. Moses call Mr. Branam "stupid" in the background during his phone 
conversation with Mr. Branam does not meet any of the requirements to establish the 
necessary foundation to admit Mr. Branam's statements as an adoptive admission 
against Mr. Moses. In fact, this representation and Mr. Ward's ultimate testimony at trial 
establish the opposite - Mr. Moses' responses tended to show a repudiation of the 
statements made by Mr. Branam, not an adoption of these statements. 
In allegedly calling Mr. Branam "stupid" while he was making these statements, 
at least according to the prosecutor's representations, along with Mr. Ward's 
subsequent testimony that a person who may have been Mr. Moses told Mr. Branam 
that he'd, "better wipe that shit off," during this phone conversation, the person Mr. Ward 
believed was Mr. Moses was demonstrating, if anything, a rejection of the remarks 
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being made by Mr. Branam, to the extent that there is any indication that these 
background remarks were directed at Mr. Branam at all. 
Additionally, the State has not challenged the district court's findings in this case 
that the "evidence" presented by the State merely showed the presence of another 
individual "who may be the defendant," rather than actually showing that Mr. Moses was 
even present during the phone call. Nor does the State dispute that the district court 
ruled these statements admissible despite clear uncertainty as to whether Mr. Moses 
was even there, finding that these other statements came from "Mr. Moses or someone 
else." (Tr., pAO, Ls.1S-21.) The district court did not even find that Mr. Moses was 
actually present at the time the remarks were made, much less that he heard 
Mr. Branam's remarks, understood what was being said, and that Mr. Moses intended 
to adopt these remarks as his own. Given the nature of the remarks of the voice in the 
background of Mr. Branam's conversation with Mr. Ward, it is clear that no adoption -
but, in fact, a repudiation - of these remarks occurred. 
It is worth noting that stringent foundational requirements are particularly 
important prior to admitting adoptive admissions against a defendant for two reasons. 
First, these statements can be considered for the truth of the matters asserted, unlike 
other forms of unsworn, out-of-court statements. See I.R.E. S01 (d)(2)(B). More 
important, because these statements were admitted as though they were Mr. Moses' 
own, there was no corresponding right of confrontation with regard to these statements. 
See People v. Jennings, 50 Cal.4th 616, 661-662 (Cal. 2010). Therefore, Mr. Moses 
had no meaningful ability to question or test the veracity of these remarks at trial, which 
were made by Mr. Branam who was unavailable as a witness at Mr. Moses' trial. 
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None of the requisite foundational requirements were established by the State in 
order to admit Mr. Branam's statements as an adoptive admission against Mr. Moses. 
Accordingly, the district court erred when it admitted Mr. Branam's statements under the 
rubric of an adoptive admission against Mr. Moses. 
D. The State Has Failed To Meet Its Burden Of Persuasion To Establish That This 
Error Was Harmless Beyond A Reasonable Doubt 
The State, in this case, makes no argument that the erroneous admission of 
Mr. Branam's statements, under the guise of an adoptive admission attributed to 
Mr. Moses, was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Under Idaho law, the State 
bears the burden of persuasion - to a standard of demonstrating beyond a reasonable 
doubt - that an objected-to trial error is harmless. See State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 
227 (2010); State v. Herrera, 152 Idaho 24,31-32 (Ct. App. 2011). The Idaho Supreme 
Court has further held that, where the State makes no attempt to establish that the error 
was harmless, that reversal is therefore required upon the defendant establishing error. 
See State v. Ruiz, 150 Idaho 469, 471 (2010). 
Just as the State declined to make any argument in Ruiz as to why the trial error 
was harmless, the State in this case has likewise failed to make any argument that the 
erroneous admission of Mr. Branam's statements against Mr. Moses under the rubric of 
an adoptive admission was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. (See Respondent's 
Brief, pp.6-9.) Because the State bears the burden of persuasion as to harmlessness, 
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and because the State has presented no argument as to why this error was harmless in 
this case, this Court should vacate Mr. Moses' judgment of conviction and sentence. 2 
II. 
The District Court Erred When The Court Refused To Permit Mr. Moses To Inquire 
About A Juror Who Expressed Reservations About His Ability To Participate Given The 
Anxiety Attacks The Juror Was Experiencing 
A. Introduction 
The State, in this case, asserts essentially that the only bases upon which a juror 
may not be qualified to continue to sit in deliberations on a criminal case is where there 
is "an expression of [ ]partiality or bias," that would require a hearing into the propriety of 
permitting the juror to remain in a criminal case. This assertion is contrary to the law. 
Where there is an indication a juror is not capable, due to a physical or mental 
condition, of receiving and deliberating upon the evidence in a criminal case, a 
defendant has the right to some form of hearing in order to determine the juror's fitness 
to continue. Because the district court denied Mr. Moses any such hearing, and failed 
to conduct any further enquiry at all, the district court erred. 
2 It is also apparent from the record that the erroneous admission of these statements 
could not be deemed harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, as Mr. Branam's 
statements are the primary direct evidence presented by the State of the supposed 
kidnapping scheme that was the basis of Mr. Moses' conviction for grand theft by 
extortion. In addition, the admission of these remarks as an adoptive admission against 
Mr. Moses were particularly harmful in that, given Mr. Branam's unavailability as a 
witness at trial, Mr. Moses had no right and no ability to confront Mr. Branam about 
these remarks or otherwise challenge their veracity. See Jennings, 50 CaLAth 616 at 
661-662. 
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B. The District Court Erred When The Court Refused To Permit Mr. Moses To 
Inquire About A Juror Who Expressed Reservations About His Ability To 
Participate Given The Anxiety Attacks The Juror Was Experiencing 
The State has suggested in this case that a trial court has no duty to inquire of a 
juror's fitness to continue to receive evidence and to deliberate in a case in absence of 
an "expression of [ ]partiality or bias." Based on this claim, the State further asserts that 
the district court did not violate Mr. Moses' right to a jury trial by an unimpaired jury or 
otherwise abuse its discretion by refusing to permit any inquiry to a juror that had 
informed the court that he didn't believe he could continue to sit in this case due to the 
extreme anxiety the juror was experiencing. 
The State's assertion is in error. While there is a dearth of case law on this 
issue, Idaho case law has recognized other circumstances, aside from actual bias or 
partiality, that may require the removal of a juror. For example, the Idaho Supreme 
Court has recognized that the intoxication of a juror may require the court to remove the 
juror if this intoxication would interfere with the juror's ability to receive the evidence. 
See, e.g., Walsh v. Winston Bros. Co., 18 Idaho 768,111 P. 1090, 1094-1095 (1910). 
While the Court in Walsh did not find that removal of the juror was required, this was 
only due to the fact that the defendant - after being afforded a hearing on the matter -
was unable to show that the juror was "in a condition which incapacitated him from 
performing his duties as a juror during the actual progress of the triaL" Id. at 1095. But 
the Walsh Court also cautioned that, "[t]rial courts should be very careful to see that 
jurors properly conduct and deport themselves after having been accepted as jurors, 
and they should not tolerate or permit any act or indulgence which in any way will 
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incapacitate the juror from performing his duty or deny to the litigants a fair and capable 
judgment of the jurors." Id. 
While the anxiety being experienced by the juror in this case is certainly not 
blameworthy in any sense, this anxiety was clearly - in the juror's own estimation -
interfering with his ability to sit as a juror to the point where he expressed concern as to 
whether he could continue to sit in the case. (Tr., p.286, L.23 - p.287, L.3.) And the 
Walsh Court makes clear that part of the trial court's on-going duty is to ensure that a 
defendant has a jury comprised of those who are capable of performing their duties as a 
juror during the progress of the trial. 
More recently, the Idaho Court of Appeals has suggested that juror 
inattentiveness or sleeping during trial may form a basis for a mistrial or the removal of 
the juror from the jury. See State v. Bolen, 143 Idaho 437, 440-441 (Ct. App. 2006). In 
Bolen, the defendant sought a new trial after the verdict based upon some evidence that 
the jurors were not paying attention, were doodling during the presentation of evidence, 
and were sleeping during the course of the trial. Id. at 439. The Bolen court held that 
the district court properly denied the motion for a new trial because a defendant must 
seek relief from the court during the course of the trial where they are aware of the 
problems with members of the jury, rather than seeking to wait until the verdict has been 
rendered to seek relief for these concerns. Id. at 440-441. 
The Bolen case is important for this Court because this is exactly what 
Mr. Moses sought to do at trial, and because the holding of the Bolen court implicitly 
contradicts the State's assertion that a district court may only take action regarding a 
juror where actual partiality or bias towards one of the parties has been expressed. 
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According to Bolen, a defendant must seek relief from the trial court at the time he or 
she becomes aware of potential jury misconduct during the course of the trial. Id. at 
440. Additionally, the Bolen Court noted that addressing these issues during the 
course of the trial, rather than after, would permit the court to conduct an adequate 
inquiry into the matter and to take appropriate remedial steps where necessary. Id. at 
441. 
Moreover, Idaho case law does not limit the defendant's right to trial by jury to 
merely a jury that is unbiased - the right is framed in much broader terms. "A defendant 
in a criminal case has not had due process of law when he has been tried and convicted 
by a jury which did not measure up to constitutional and statutory requirements." 
State v. Nadiman, 63 Idaho 153, 118 P.2d 58, 62 (1941). Among the defendant's 
constitutional rights, with regard to jury trials, is the right to "a tribunal both impartial and 
mentally competent to afford a hearing." Tanner v. U.S., 483, U.S. 107, 126 (1987) 
(quoting Jordan v. Massachusetts, 225 U.S. 167, 176 (1912)); see also State v DeGrat, 
128 Idaho 352,355 (1996). The Sixth Amendment right to a jury therefore carries with it 
the right to an unimpaired jury, and this right is secured in part by the on-going oversight 
of the trial court during the actual conduct of the trial. Id. 
In order to ensure that this right is protected, the remedy for allegations of juror 
misconduct or lack of capacity to proceed, presented during trial, is a hearing in which a 
defendant is permitted to establish a record regarding the juror's bias or incapacity. 
See, e.g., Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 215-217 (1982). "Due process means a jury 
capable and willing to decide the case solely on the evidence before it, and a trial judge 
ever watchful to prevent prejudicial occurrences and to determine the effect of such 
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occurrences when they happen." Id. at 217. And a hearing on the issue is the 
appropriate manner in which to effectuate that right. Id. 
Moreover, while Idaho has not yet had the occasion to address potential juror 
incapacity due to anxiety or another mental condition, other jurisdictions have 
addressed such an issue and determined that this may be an appropriate basis upon 
which to dismiss a juror. See, e.g., Sullivan v. Fogg, 613 F.2d 465 (2d Cir. 1980); 
Burlley v. State, 476 N.E.2d 835 (1985). 
Mr. Moses had the constitutional right to an unimpaired jury that was capable of 
receiving and deliberating upon all of the evidence presented at trial. According to U.S. 
Supreme Court precedent, the trial court is tasked with on-going oversight on issues 
relating to juror competence or misconduct during the conduct of the trial. The district 
court in this case therefore abused its discretion, and further violated Mr. Moses' 
constitutional right to due process and an unimpaired jury, when the court precluded 
any inquiry into the juror who indicated that he may have lacked the capacity to 
proceed. 
III. 
The District Court Erred When It Refused To Permit Mr. Moses To Call A Witness To 
The Stand To Testify About Mr. Branam's Prior Consistent Statements After The Court 
Had Allowed The State To Present Mr. Branam's Prior Inconsistent Statements 
A. Introduction 
Because the evidence of Mr. Branam's prior consistent statements to Ed Yankey, 
which confirmed his preliminary hearing testimony that Mr. Moses was not involved in 
any extortion scheme, were initiated by Mr. Branam at his own prompting, were 
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tendered to a completely neutral party, and were made in a context outside of the undue 
influence suggested by the State regarding Mr. Branam's preliminary hearing testimony, 
this evidence was not cumulative and should have been admitted by the district court. 
B. The District Court Erred When It Refused To Permit Mr. Moses To Call A 
Witness To The Stand To Testify About Mr. Branam's Prior Consistent 
Statements After The Court Had Allowed The State To Present Mr. Branam's 
Prior Inconsistent Statements 
The State's sole contention on appeal is that the excluded evidence of 
Mr. Branam's prior consistent statements, which Mr. Moses sought to have admitted to 
rebut the State's allegation that Mr. Branam had fabricated his preliminary hearing 
testimony, were cumulative. This contention is not supported by the legal standards 
governing admissibility of prior consistent statements under !.RE. 801(d)(1)(B). 
First and foremost, the provisions of !.RE. 801 (d)(1 )(B) necessarily contemplate 
that the statements admitted under this rule will address the same subject matter and 
will deal with the same content as testimony or statements already admitted at trial. 
This provision, by its terms, addresses the admissibility of statements that are 
consistent with that prior testimony - meaning that the statement will deal with the 
same subject matter and will reflect the same content. See !.R.E. 801 (d)(1)(B). The 
purpose of this rule is not that these statements provide some completely unique 
substantive content, but that they are offered for a particular purpose: to rebut an 
express or implied charge of recent fabrication, or improper influence or motive. !.RE. 
801 (d)(1 )(B). To the extent that the State is asserting that the fact that the statements 
made by Mr. Branam were consistent with his testimony at the preliminary hearing, this 
argument ignores the plain language of this rule. 
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Moreover, while Mr. Moses agrees with the State that the Idaho Supreme Court 
Opinion in State v. McAway is instructive for this Court, he submits that this Opinion 
demonstrates why the district court erred in not admitting Mr. Branam's statements to 
Mr. Yankey as prior consistent statements. In McAway, the Court determined that a 
prior consistent statement made by the alleged victim was properly admitted into 
evidence as a prior consistent statement based upon the existence of two factors. See 
State v. McAway, 127 Idaho 54, 58-59 (1995). First, the prior consistent statement at 
issue was tendered to a neutral party to the proceedings. Id. Second, the statement 
was made outside the presence of the party who was alleged to have exerted undue 
influence over the victim. Id. Both of these factors are present in this case. 
Mr. Yankey was housed with Mr. Branam while they were both incarcerated. 
(Tr., p.468, Ls.21-23.) Mr. Branam approached Mr. Yankey with questions about 
whether Mr. Yankey had seen Mr. Moses during a court proceeding. (Tr., p.468, Ls.23-
25.) Mr. Yankey, apparently unfamiliar with any of the proceedings in this case, asked 
why Mr. Branam had asked about Mr. Moses; and Mr. Branam volunteered that, "Moses 
was in jail because of [Mr. Branam], and he shouldn't be in jail because Joshua Moses 
didn't do anything wrong." (Tr., p.469, Ls.1-7.) 
Unlike the preliminary hearing, Mr. Moses was not present for this conversation. 
In addition, this offer of proof indicates that Mr. Yankey was not familiar with Mr. Moses' 
case at all, and therefore was a neutral party to whom Mr. Branam volunteered these 
statements. Moreover, and contrary to the State's suggestion, the fact that Mr. Branam 
volunteered the information as to his involvement in Mr. Moses' case spontaneously 
would tend to negate the State's claim of undue influence based upon fears of being 
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considered a "snitch" at trial. If this was truly Mr. Branam's motivating concerned, then 
he would not have spontaneously revealed to Mr. Yankey that he was the person 
responsible for Mr. Moses' incarceration when Mr. Yankey was not otherwise aware of 
that fact. Accordingly, Mr. Branam's statements to Mr. Yankey, which confirmed his 
preliminary hearing testimony, were improperly excluded by the district court because 
they were proper prior consistent statements that were admissible under I.R.E. 
801(d)(1)(B). 
IV. 
The Prosecutor Committed Misconduct, Rising To The Level Of A Fundamental Error, 
By Arguing Facts Not In Evidence, Misstating The Evidence, And Appealing To The 
Passions And Prejudices Of The Jurors 
A. Introduction 
The prosecutor in this case presented false testimony regarding an immunity 
agreement it entered into with Mr. Branam, and then argued that false evidence to the 
jury during closing arguments. On appeal, the State has argued that the fact that this 
false testimony was permitted into evidence, without being corrected by the State, 
renders the prosecutor's repetition of this false evidence somehow permissible. 
Because the terms of the immunity agreement were clear, and because the State's 
argument is contrary to long-standing precedent from the United States Supreme Court, 
the prosecutor committed misconduct rising to the level of a fundamental error when he 
argued false evidence before the jury during closing argument. 
16 
B. The Prosecutor Committed Misconduct, Rising To The Level Of A Fundamental 
Error, By Arguing Facts Not In Evidence, Misstating The Evidence, And 
Appealing To The Passions And Prejudices Of The Jurors 
[I[t is established that a conviction obtained through the use of false 
evidence, known to be such by representatives of the State, must fall 
under the Fourteenth Amendment. The same result obtains when the 
State, although not soliciting false evidence, allows it to go uncorrected 
when it appears. 
Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 268 (1959) (emphasis added). 
In this case, Mr. Moses has asserted that it was misconduct for the prosecutor to 
have argued falsely to the jury that they should disregard Mr. Branam's preliminary 
hearing testimony because, under the immunity agreement he entered into with the 
State regarding this testimony, "whatever he says he can't get in trouble for, so 
whatever he says might as well benefit himself." (Tr., p.527, Ls.3-9; Appellant's Brief, 
pp.28-30.) The State has responded that, because false preliminary hearing testimony 
was introduced that misrepresented the terms of the actual immunity agreement, "The 
prosecutor's reiteration of this testimony and comment thereon was not improper." 
(Respondent's Brief, pp.24-25.) This argument not only ignores the on-going duty of the 
prosecutor to correct false testimony, as articulated by the U.S. Supreme Court over 
half a century ago, but would actively seek to make the presentation of false evidence at 
a preliminary hearing, and read into the record at trial, a sanction for the repeated 
iteration and emphasis of this false testimony by a prosecutor during closing arguments. 
The evidence of the actual immunity agreement is unquestionably in the record 
on appeal - it was tendered in conjunction with Mr. Moses' criminal case and has been 
cited to by both Mr. Moses and the State in this appeal. (R., p.31; Appellant's Brief, 
p.29; Respondent's Brief, p.24.) The State drafted this agreement as part of this 
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criminal case, and controlled the terms of the grant of immunity. (R., p.31.) This 
immunity agreement provided in no uncertain terms that Mr. Branam, "may nevertheless 
be prosecuted and subject to penalty for perjury, false swearing, or contempt committed 
in testifying at the aforementioned preliminary hearing." (R., p.31.) 
The prosecutor at the preliminary hearing, Art Verharen, was the same 
prosecutor as conducted Mr. Moses' trial and was presumably aware of this agreement. 
His awareness of the agreement is apparent given that he asked the following question 
of Mr. Branam at the preliminary hearing after Mr. Branam denied that Mr. Moses had 
any involvement in the extortion scheme, "By the terms of - of your immunity here 
today, you realize you can't be prosecuted for what you testified to." (Prelim. Tr., p.73, 
Ls.13-15.) Mr. Branam agreed with Mr. Verharen's characterization (although he may 
have done so because he was telling the truth, and had therefore not committed perjury, 
when he denied Mr. Moses had any involvement in the extortion scheme). Because the 
substance of this question conveyed that Mr. Branam had absolutely no consequences 
for giving even perjured testimony, this was false and known to be such by 
representatives of the State. 3 
Although this question and answer were read into evidence at trial, this would not 
permit or sanction the same prosecutor who elicited the false testimony from arguing to 
the jury facts contained therein that are known to be false. That is because the State is 
not permitted to allow false testimony to go uncorrected at trial. Napue, 360 U.S. at 
3 To the extent that the State's argument on appeal may be interpreted as asserting that 
a grant of immunity may be unilaterally altered or expanded based upon the mere fact 
of a witness testifying falsely as to the terms of the agreement, the State cites no 
authority for this proposition. State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 263 (1996). (See also 
Respondent's Brief, p.25.) 
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269; State v. Wheeler, 149 Idaho 364, 368 (2010). And it is of no accord if the false 
testimony is limited to matters bearing on the credibility of the witnesses at trial: 
The principle that a State may not knowingly use false evidence, including 
false testimony, to obtain a tainted conviction, implicit in any concept of 
ordered liberty, does not cease to apply merely because the false 
testimony goes only to the credibility of the witness. The jury's estimate of 
the truthfulness and reliability of a given witness may well be 
determinative of guilt or innocence, and it is upon such subtle factors as 
the possible interest of the witness in testifying falsely that a defendant's 
life or liberty may depend. 
Napue, 360 U.S. at 269. 
Therefore, according to well-established and long-standing constitutional 
jurisprudence, it was misconduct for the prosecutor in this case not only to fail to correct 
the false testimony that was placed before the jury, but to repeat the due process 
violation by arguing and emphasizing this false evidence in closing arguments as 
though it were true. 
Additionally, contrary to the State's assertion, the evidence of the plain terms of 
the immunity agreement are sufficient to establish its terms within the record - the 
State's exhortation for this Court to ignore the "cold record" of the actual terms of the 
agreement is contrary to the manner in which, as a matter of law, immunity agreements 
are reviewed. (See Respondent's Brief, p.25.) As a species of contract, immunity 
agreements are interpreted consistently with the manner in which other contract issues 
are interpreted on appeal. See, e.g., State v. Barnett, 133 Idaho 231, 234 (1999). "The 
meaning of an unambiguous contract and the intent of the parties is determined from 
the plain meaning of the contract's own words." Id. (emphasis added). 
The State presents no argument that the terms of the written immunity 
agreement, as reflected in the record in this case, contain any ambiguity. 
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(Respondent's Brief, p.25.) Nor would it be reasonable for the State to do so given that 
this agreement states in the plainest terms that Mr. Branam would still be criminally 
liable for any perjury committed during his testimony at Mr. Moses' preliminary hearing. 
(R., p.31.) The actual immunity agreement between the State and Mr. Branam, which is 
part of the record on appeal in this case, is unambiguous as to potential penalties for 
Mr. Branam's false testimony; and the State's assertion that this agreement should not 
be taken as evidence of its own terms is contrary to both law and logic. 
Nor would there be any strategic reason for trial counsel's failure to object, given 
the extreme importance of Mr. Branam's preliminary hearing testimony to Mr. Moses' 
assertions of his innocence. This fact is acknowledged by the State in this appeal. 
(Respondent's Brief, p.26.) Unlike the statements that Mr. Branam made to Mr. Ward 
that tended to inculpate Mr. Moses as part of an extortion scheme, the testimony 
presented by Mr. Branam at the preliminary hearing were under oath and - contrary to 
the prosecutor's suggestion during closing arguments - under the penalty of perjury, a 
felony offense in the State of Idaho. See I.C. §§ 18-5401, 18-5409. The fact that 
Mr. Branam was aware that he risked separate punishment as a felony were he to 
testify falsely at the preliminary hearing was evidence that would have been critical to 
the jury's evaluation of his credibility. 
Mr. Branam's testimony was the centerpiece to Mr. Moses' evidence at trial and 
its importance to his defense cannot be overstated. (Tr., p.513, L.22 - p.525, L.15.) 
Under these facts, there was no strategic reason why defense counsel would not have 
raised an objection to the presentation of false evidence on perhaps the most critical 
issue for the jury to resolve: whether Mr. Branam was telling the truth when he testified 
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at the preliminary hearing that Mr. Moses was not involved in Mr. Branam's concocted 
extortion scheme to obtain money from Mr. Ward. 
For this same reason, the prosecutor's violation of Mr. Moses' due process right 
to a fair trial by arguing facts known by the State to be false was not harmless. Despite 
acknowledging that Mr. Branam's testimony at the preliminary hearing was the most 
critical evidence for his defense at trial, the State argues that any misconduct in this 
case was harmless. (Respondent's Brief, p.26.) However, the State's harmlessness 
argument is essentially that the remaining evidence, outside of any of Mr. Branam's 
testimony, might have been sufficient to sustain a conviction. (Respondent's Brief, 
p.26.) This argument is misplaced for three reasons. 
First, because Mr. Branam's statements were the only direct evidence of any 
extortion scheme at a", the State is incorrect in its assertion that the remaining evidence 
aside from his testimony would be sufficient to sustain a conviction. Second, the fact 
that the prosecutor in this case argued the false evidence as the core reason why the 
jury should disregard Mr. Branam's testimony, in and of itself, speaks to the materiality 
and importance of the terms of the immunity agreement as they relate to Mr. Branam's 
credibility. See also Napue, 360 U.S. at 270 (noting the prosecutor's actions in 
highlighting the false testimony as evidence of its importance at trial). 
But the larger problem with the State's argument is that this is not the test by 
which this Court measures harmlessness. Instead, the test is whether there is a 
reasonable possibility that the misconduct affected the verdict rendered by the jury. 
State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 226 (2010). Given the centrality of Mr. Branam's 
testimony, and the fact that the prosecutor's use of false evidence in closing argument 
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went to the core of Mr. Branam's credibility during his preliminary hearing testimony, this 
standard has been met. 
Mr. Branam's statements provided the sole evidence of any extortion plot against 
his brother-in-law, Mr. Ward. His testimony at the preliminary hearing, given while 
under oath and with the penalty of perjury, was also - by the State's own concession -
Mr. Moses' strongest proof of his innocence of any participation in this scheme. In this 
case, the jury's verdict was necessarily dependent upon which set of statements by 
Mr. Branam the jury believed. As such, because the jury's measure of the credibility of 
Mr. Branam's statements at the preliminary hearing was the hinge upon which the 
verdict in this case turned, there a reasonable possibility that the misconduct in this 
case affected the outcome of the trial. See Napue, 360 U.S. at 269. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Moses respectfully requests that this Court vacate his judgment of conviction 
and sentence, and remand this case for further proceedings. 
DATED this 31 st day of August, 2012. 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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